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This thesis will explore the safeguard clauses in the Iceland-China Free Trade Agreement and 
look into how other free trade agreements have dealt with the same issue.  Especially how GATT 
and WTO have handled the issue and how the clauses have been negotiated in free trade agreements 
between nations. It will attempt to analyze the reasoning behind the forming of the safeguard 
clauses. In exploring standard safeguard clauses in other free trade agreements, and their 
application, it will be explored how likely it is that safeguard clauses in the free trade agreement 
between Iceland and China will be applied. 
When looked at the evolution of safeguard clauses in free trade agreements it can be seen that 
they are seldom invoked and this thesis will explore if the same will apply in the Iceland-China Free 
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Studies on Safeguard Clauses of Iceland-China Free Trade Agreement 
 
1. Introduction 
This thesis will explore the safeguard clauses in the Iceland-China Free Trade Agreement and 
look into how other free trade agreements have dealt with the same issue.  Especially how GATT 
and WTO have handled the issue and how the clauses have been negotiated in free trade agreements 
between nations. It will attempt to analyze the reasoning behind the forming of the safeguard 
clauses. In exploring standard safeguard clauses in other free trade agreements, and their 
application, it will be explored how likely it is that safeguard clauses in the free trade agreement 
between Iceland and China will be applied. 
When looked at the evolution of safeguard clauses in free trade agreements it can be seen that 
they are seldom invoked and this thesis will explore if the same will apply in the Iceland-China Free 
Trade Agreement.  
In 2012 China was Iceland´s 4th largest importing country and the largest trading partner in 
Asia.  Icelandic exports to China have been growing fast in the past years and China ranks as 
Iceland´s no. 19 export market. It is expected that the Iceland-China Free Trade Agreement will 
have a significant positive effect on trade between Iceland and China in the near future.  Iceland 
has an export driven economy with three main industries; tourism, fisheries and power intensive 
industries, which are not estimated to be negatively affected by the free trade agreement.  Smaller 
production sectors in Iceland might be affected, but the importance to the local economy is not 
significant and it is unlikely that those industries will have the political and economic influence to 
trigger any safeguard measures.  The Chinese economy is also export driven, but the difference in 
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significant effect on Chinese industries.  China is the second largest economy in the world 
measured in GDP, with a nominal GDP of 9,300 billion USD (2013), while Iceland has a GDP of 
14 billion USD (2013) and is ranked as the 123rd largest economy in the world.  The population of 
Iceland is 330,000 while China has a population of 1.3 billion people.  Imports from China to 
Iceland in 2012 were 7.2% of total imports in Iceland, 365 million USD, while exports to China 
were 66 million USD, 1.1% of total exports from Iceland in 2012.1   
 
1.1. Definition of Safeguard Measures 
There has been a sharp increase in free trade agreements in the world over the last decades. 
This trade liberalization brings with it increased competition and can affect domestic industries. 
This can lead to hardship for affected domestic industries. If that is the case then there are certain 
trade remedies that are available to protect industries from foreign competition. When there is 
suddenly an upsurge in imports into a country following a free trade agreement, the countries can 
turn to safeguard provisions in free trade agreements to protect the affected domestic industry. 
Having safeguard clauses in free trade agreements can calm the sectors that could be 
vulnerable to imports and can be absolutely necessary to gain the political support needed for 
implementation of the agreement.2 
Safeguard measures can be seen as a sort of safety valve on free trade agreements. A natural 
effect of trade liberalization is an increase in imports but it is often recognized that in trade practices 
there can come up certain situations where it may become difficult to sustain the import 
liberalization to the level where it can keep being healthy for the trade liberalization and can 
                                     
1 Statistic Iceland, Statistica Yearbook of Iceland 2013. Issue date: 2013/11/25, p. 53-72 
2 Kotera, Akira, and Tomofumi Kitamura. "On the Comparison of Safeguard Mechanisms of Free Trade 
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therefore strain the trade liberalizing functions of the agreement. Before the 1947 GATT agreement 
most bilateral trade agreements usually had a safety valve in the form of safeguard measures.3 
It can be good for nations, faced with the option of having their domestic market severely 
disrupted or withdrawing from the trade agreement, to be able to use safeguard measures to reduce 
the trade liberalization without completely breaking the agreement. 
 
1.2. Evolution of Safeguard Mechanisms (History of GATT Article XIX, WTO 
Agreement on Safeguards, and Safeguard Clauses in FTA) 
The first GATT negotiations were finished in 1947, where it was expected that GATT would 
be replaced after a few years with a new institution called the International Trade Organization. 
Support for that organization died out though, and the organization was not formed. GATT then 
became the main instrument governing international trade until the creation of The World Trade 
Organization (WTO) in 1995. The agreement and the first clause of Article XIX was then formed 
with the purpose of it being short-lived. The agreement had made many trade concessions to each 
other with the agreement and Article XIX gave them leave to suspend these concessions if domestic 
industry faced unforeseen competition from imports. It might then be seen that "unforeseen 
developments" would be something that was unforeseen at the forming of the GATT agreement in 
1947. An agreement that was not supposed to be in place for as long a time as it has.4 
According to Alan O. Sykes, in his paper The Safeguard Mess: A Critique of WTO 
Jurisprudence, claims that many aspects of GATT Article XIX became outdated as the GATT 
system evolved, and that GATT practice over the years has rendered its first clause void. The long 
                                     
3 Lee, Yong-Shik. "The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: Improvement on the GATT Article XIX?." The 
International Trade Journal. XIV.no. 3 (2000): Print, p. 283 
4 Lee, Yong-Shik. "The WTO Agreement on Safeguards: Improvement on the GATT Article XIX?." The 
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time that has gone by since the agreement was put in place has rendered the first clause up to 
complex interpretations that were not intended to be in place over decades but rather over a few 
years. Alan O. Sykes claims that for those reasons that GATT practice evolved over time toward 
ignoring the requirements of the first clause in Article XIX.5 
 
1.3 History of WTO Agreement on Safeguards 
Nations had tried to amend GATT Article XIX in order to address its faults and bringing it in 
line with WTO rules. Early it was tried to supplement safeguard regulations during the Tokyo round 
of talks in 1979 but to no avail. During the next round of talks, the so called Uruguay round (1986-
1994), discussions were more successful. Many of the faults of GATT Article XIX were 
supplemented with the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. In this new agreement member states 
admitted that there was a need to clarify the rules of the GATT Agreement, specifically of GATT 
Article XIX, and to eliminate measures that are in the grey area and escape safeguard controls. 
The Agreement on Safeguards therefore banned all existing "grey area" measures and require 
member states to phase out or eliminate these measures over a four year time span. The new 
agreement also introduced a clause which placed time limits on the duration of safeguard measures, 
initially four years but could be expanded to eight. Other areas of ambiguity were also attempted to 
be cleared up, the importing country now has to conduct a proper investigation before they can use 
safeguard measures. Emphasis was put on trying to end extra-legal measures, and to try and restore 
legal discipline over the protection of troubled industries. Article 11(1)(b) of the WTO Agreement 
on Safeguards states that a member shall not seek, take or maintain any voluntary export restraints, 
orderly marketing arrangements or any other similar measures on the export or the import side. The 
                                     
5 Sykes, Alan O. The Safeguard Mess: A Critique of WTO Jurisprudence. 2D Series. Chicago: The Law 
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WTO Agreement not only prohibited these extra-legal measures but also tried to remove some of 
the incentives for using extra-legal measures by altering the compensation requirement. According 
to the agreement members using safeguards should "...endeavor to maintain a substantially 
equivalent level of concessions." It is also stated that if negotiations over the compensations are not 
successful then there is no right of retaliation during the first three years of safeguard measures that 
conforms to the legal requirements of the Agreement and that follows an increase in the level of 
imports. Nations that are affected by safeguard actions must settle for less compensation otherwise 
they will get nothing in three years’ time.6 
 
1.4. Conclusion of Iceland-China FTA and the Characteristics of Its Safeguard 
Clauses 
In May 2005 Iceland and China made an agreement about studying the feasibility of an 
Iceland China free trade agreement. That feasibility study was concluded in July 2006 and it 
concluded that the two nations should start free trade negotiations as soon as possible as it would be 
beneficial to both nations. Later in 2006 China and Iceland signed a statement of intent of free trade 
negotiations. 
The initial rounds of free trade discussions where then started in 2007, when three rounds of 
discussions were held. The fourth round was held in April 2008, after which free trade negotiations 
were suspended, allegedly because of little interest from the Chinese side. China had at that time 
started free trade negotiations with other EFTA nations such as Norway and Switzerland. At the 
time of suspension of the discussions the two sides claimed to still be far apart. 
                                     
6 Choi, Wong-Mog. "FTAs and Safeguard Norms: Their Variation and Compatibility." Asian Journal of 
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In the fall of 2008, Iceland went through major financial crisis and the event had great 
economic and political influence. All major financial institution were affected and the three 
privately owned major international banks that were operated in Iceland collapsed.  The banking 
sector before the crash was important to the economy and the balance sheet of the financial 
institutions in Iceland were more than 10 times the GDP and it was not an option for the state to try 
to save the banks.  Following the crash the valuation of the Icelandic Krona against major 
currencies fell more than 50% and market capitalization of the stock market fell by over 90%.  
Following the financial crisis Iceland went through a severe economic recession and the nation was 
very vulnerable and people were afraid of larger nations taking advantage of Iceland's vulnerability. 
There started to build up some opposition towards free trade negotiations with China. Rather than 
being against concrete aspects of free trade with China, the opposition was more aimed generally 
towards negotiating with such a large and powerful nation. This opposition was not being aired 
publicly by politicians but mainly can be seen in newspaper articles from the time.7  
The Icelandic foreign ministry which led the free trade discussion assured people that 
safeguard measures in the agreement would protect Iceland from any negative effects from the free 
trade agreement. The safeguard measures were therefore a very important tool for gaining political 
support for the free trade negotiations.8 
For the next two years the talks were not active and did not progress until the Icelandic 
foreign minister, Össur Skarphéðinsson, went to China for an official visit. There the Icelandic side 
made known their interest in revisiting the negotiation table. Two years after that, in 2012, then 
prime minister of China, Wen Jiabo, went to Iceland for an official visit where he declared that 
                                     
7 This can be seen from newspaper reports from the time. Also the lack of political opposition towards the 
free trade negotiations can be seen in the discussions in the Icelandic Parlament, dates; 15.10.2013, 
23.01.2014, 29.01.2014 
8 "Fríverslun við Kína. Samningaferlið." Heimasíða Utanríkisráðuneytis Íslands. Utanríkisráðuneytið, n.d. 
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China was interested in opening up free trade negotiations again. Negotiations started again in 
December of that year, which was then followed with the sixth and final round of discussions, held 
in Beijing in January 2013. 
Iceland and China finally signed a free trade agreement between the two nations in April 
2013. That is the first free trade agreement China signs with a European nation. 
The main gain for Iceland is the suspension of customs on exporting into China. Almost all 
seafood products, which are Iceland's main export commodity, become customs free with the 
agreement. Iceland also suspends customs on products, except agricultural, that China would export 
into Iceland. This should lead to lower prices for consumers in Iceland and provide businesses with 
new opportunities following increased trade with China and competitive advantage in some fields 
compared to other European countries. China therefore gains access to the Icelandic market, which 
even though is small compared to the Chinese one, could serve as an important test market for 
Chinese companies willing to enter into Europe. China could also benefit from the free trade 




2. Global Safeguard Measures (Article 17, Iceland-China FTA) 
Article 17 Global Safeguard Measures 
1. The Parties maintain their rights and obligations under Article XIX of the GATT l994 and 
the WTO Agreement on Safeguards. 
                                     
9 "Fríverslun við Kína. Spurningar og Svör." Heimasíða Utanríkisráðuneytis Íslands. Utanríkisráðuneytið, 
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